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Abstract. Bitcoin has attracted everyone’s attention and interest re-
cently. Ethereum (ETH), a second generation cryptocurrency, extends
Bitcoin’s design by offering a Turing-complete programming language
called Solidity to develop smart contracts. Smart contracts allow cred-
itable execution of contracts on EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) with-
out third parties. Developing correct smart contracts is challenging due
to its decentralized computation nature. Buggy smart contracts may lead
to huge financial loss. Furthermore, smart contracts are very hard, if not
impossible, to patch once they are deployed. Thus, there is a recent surge
of interest on analyzing/verifying smart contracts. While existing work
focuses on EVM opcode, we argue that it is equally important to under-
stand and define the semantics of Solidity since programmers program
and reason about smart contracts at the level of source code. In this
work, we develop the structural operational semantics for Solidity, which
allows us to identify multiple design issues which underlines many prob-
lematic smart contracts. Furthermore, our semantics is executable in the
K framework, which allows us to verify/falsify contracts automatically.
1 Introduction
The success of Bitcoin since 2009 stimulates the development of other blockchain
based applications such as Ethereum. Ethereum is a second generation of cryp-
tocurrency which supports the revolutionary idea of smart contracts. A smart
contract [3] is a computer program written in a Turing-complete programming
language called Solidity, which is stored on the blockchain to achieve certain
functionality. Smart contracts benefit from the features of blockchain in various
aspects. For instance, it is not necessary to have an external trusted authority in
order to achieve consensus, and transactions through smart contracts are always
traceable and credible.
Smart contracts must be verified for multiple reasons. Firstly, due to the
decentralized nature of blockchain, smart contracts are different from original
programs (e.g., C/Java). For instance, in addition to stack and heap, smart con-
tracts operate a third ‘memory’ called storage, which are permanent addresses
on the blockchain. Programming smart contracts thus is error-prone without a
proper understanding of the underlying semantic model. This is further worsened
by multiple language design choices (e.g., fallback functions) made by Solidity.
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1 contract Test {
2 uint128 a = 1;
3 uint256 b = 2;
4
5 function foo() public {
6 uint256 [2] d;
7 d[0] = 7;
8 d[1] = 8;
9 }
10 }
(a)
1 contract Test2 {
2 uint128 a = 9;
3 uint128 [3][2] b = [[1,2,3] ,[4,5,6]];
4
5 function foo2() public {
6 uint256 [3] d;
7 d[1] = 10;
8 d[2] = 11;
9 }
10 }
(b)
Fig. 1. Strange Contracts
In the following, we illustrate the difference between smart contracts and orig-
inal programs using the contract named Test2 shown in Fig. 1 (b), where b
is a global two dimension array, i.e., b[0] = [1,2,3] and b[1] = [4,5,6]. In
function foo2(), a local array d of three elements is declared. Its second and
third elements are set to be 10 and 11 respectively afterwards. After the execu-
tion of foo2(), the global array b is changed as: b[0] = [0,10,0] and b[1]
= [4,5,6]. To understand this surprising behavior, we must understand the
storage/memory model of Solidity, and make sure it is formally defined so that
programmers can write contracts accordingly. If a programmer implements a
smart contract with his/her intension inconsistent with the Solidity semantics,
vulnerabilities are very likely to be introduced.
Secondly, a smart contract can be created and called by any user in the
network. A bug in the contract potentially leads to threats to the security prop-
erties of smart contracts. Verifying smart contracts against such bugs is crucial
for protecting digital assets. One well-known attack on smart contracts is the
DAO attack [4]. The attacker exploited a vulnerability associated with fallback
functions and the reentrancy property in the DAO smart contract [8], and man-
aged to drain more than 3.6 million ETH (i.e., the Etheruem coin which has a
value of about $1000 at the time of writing). Thirdly, unlike traditional software
which can be patched, it is very hard if not impossible to patch a smart con-
tract, once it is deployed on the blockchain due to the very nature of blockchain.
For instance, the team behind Ethereum decided to conduct a soft-fork of the
Ethereum network in view of the DAO attack, which caused a lot of controver-
sial. It is thus extremely important that a smart contract is verified before it is
deployed as otherwise it will be forever under the risk of being attacked.
There have been a surge of interests in developing analysis/verification tech-
niques for smart contracts [16,9,2,1]. For instance, the authors in [16] developed
a symbolic execution engine called Oyente which targets bytecode running on
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Since Solidity programs are compiled into
bytecode and run on EVM, Oyente can be used to analyze Solidity programs.
In addition, the authors in [9] developed a semantic encoding of EVM bytecode
in the K-framework. To the best of our knowledge, all existing approaches fo-
cus on bytecode. We believe that it is equally important to formally understand
the semantics of Solidity since programmers program and reason about smart
contracts at the level of source code. Otherwise, programmers are required to
understand how Solidity programs are compiled into bytecode in order to un-
derstand them, which is far from trivial.
In this work, we develop the structural operational semantics (SOS) for the
Solidity programming language so that smart contracts written in Solidity can be
formally reasoned about. The contributions of this work are twofold. Firstly, our
work is the first approach, to our knowledge, on the formal semantics of the Solid-
ity programming language other than the Solidity compiler itself. Our executable
semantics covers most of the semantics specified by the official Solidity documen-
tation [7]. Secondly, we implement the proposed SOS in K-framework [5], which
provides a Reachability Logic prover [11]. With the proposed SOS and its imple-
mentation, we are able to detect vulnerabilities or reason about the correctness
of smart contracts written in Solidity systematically.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce the background of Solidity smart contracts. The proposed executable
operational semantics is introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce
the implementation of Solidity semantics in K-framework by illustrating some
important rules. Section 5 shows the evaluation results of our Solidity semantics
in K-framework. In Section 6, we review related works. Section 7 concludes this
work and discusses our future directions.
2 Background of Solidity Smart Contracts
Ethereum, proposed in late 2013 by Vitalik Buterin, is a blockchain-based dis-
tributed computing platform supporting smart contract functionality. It provides
a decentralized international network where each participant node (also known
as miner) equipped with EVM can execute smart contracts. Ethereum also pro-
vides a cryptocurrency called “ether” (ETH), which can be transferred between
different accounts and used to compensate participant nodes for their computa-
tions on smart contracts.
Solidity is one of the high-level programming languages to implement smart
contracts on Ethereum. A smart contract written in Solidity can be compiled
into EVM bytecode and then be executed by any participant node equipped with
EVM. Fig. 2 shows an example of Solidity smart contract, named Coin, imple-
menting a very simple cryptocurrency. A Solidity smart contract is a collection
of code (its functions) and data (its state) that resides at a specific address on
the Ethereum blockchain. In line 2, the public state variable minter of type
address is declared to store the minter of the cryptocurrency, i.e., the owner of
the smart contract. The constructor Coin(), which has the same name as the
smart contract, is defined in lines 5–7. Once the smart contract is created and
deployed3, its constructor is invoked automatically, and minter is set to be the
address of its creator (owner), represented by the built-in keyword msg.sender.
In line 3, the public state variable balances is declared to store the balances of
users. It is of type mapping, which can be considered as a hash-table mapping
3 How to create and deploy a smart contract is out of scope and can be found in:
https://solidity.readthedocs.io/
1 contract Coin {
2 address public minter;
3 mapping (address => uint) public balances;
4
5 function Coin() public {
6 minter = msg.sender;
7 }
8
9 function mint(address receiver , uint amount) public {
10 if (msg.sender != minter) return;
11 balances[receiver] += amount;
12 }
13
14 function send(address receiver , uint amount) public {
15 if (balances[msg.sender] < amount) return;
16 balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
17 balances[receiver] += amount;
18 }
19 }
Fig. 2. Smart Contract Example
from keys to values. In this example, balances maps from an user (represented
as an address) to his/her balance (represented as an unsigned integer value).
The mint() function, defined in lines 9–12, is supposed to be invoked only
by its owner to mint amount coins for the user located at the receiver address.
If mint() is called by anyone except the owner of the contract, nothing will
happen because of the guarding if statement in line 10. The send() function,
defined in lines 14–18, can be invoked by any user to transfer amount coins to
another user located at the receiver address. If the balance is not sufficient,
noting will happen because of the guarding if statement in line 15; otherwise,
the balances of both sides will be updated accordingly.
A blockchain is actually a globally-shared transactional database or ledger.
Every participant node can read the information in the blockchain. If one wants
to make any state change in the blockchain, he or she has to create a so-called
transaction which has to be accepted and validated by all other participant
nodes. Furthermore, once a transaction is applied to the blockchain, no other
transactions can alter it. For example, deploying the Coin smart contract gener-
ates a transaction because the state of the blockchain is going to be changed, i.e.,
one more smart contract instance will be included. Similarly, any invocation of
the functions mint() and send() also generates transactions because the state
of the contract instance, which is a part of the whole blockchain, is going to be
changed. As mentioned earlier, each transaction has to be validated by other
participant nodes. This validation procedure is so-called mining, and the partic-
ipant nodes validating transactions are called miners. To motivate the miners
to execute and validate transactions on the blockchain, they are rewarded ETH,
which drives the blockchain functionally. Thus, each transaction is charged with
a transaction fee to reward the miners. The transaction fee depends on the prod-
uct of the gas price and the amount of gas. When one requests a transaction to
be mined, he or she can decide the gas price to be paid. Of course, the higher
the price is, the more likely miners are willing to validate the transaction. The
amount of gas is determined by the computation required by the transaction.
The more computation a transaction requires, the more gas miners will charge.
A smart contract instance has two memory areas to store data, namely,
storage and memory. Storage is an array of storage slots, each of which is 32 bytes
long and addressable by an 256-bit address. When a contract is created, its static
data is allocated in the storage from storage slot 0 and growing to higher slots.
Dynamic data such as pushing a new element into a dynamic array is allocated
based on a hash algorithm. Complex datatypes such as arrays or structs are
aligned to storage slot (32 bytes), adding padding to fill the necessary space.
Primitive datatypes allocated in adjacent positions are packed together to save
space. The storage/memory model is formally introduced in Section 3.
3 Formal Specification of Solidity
We build an abstract model of the Solidity semantics. These representations of
rules omit the details in the rule formation in K-framework, but reveal the idea
of the semantics from a general as well as abstract perspective.
3.1 Notations
Type Specification Types are inductively defined in T, as follows:
K := uintm | address | K[n]
T := uintm | address | T[n] | T[ ] | mapping K T | 〈T · · ·T〉 | contract | ref T
Implicitly, types in Solidity have associated a memory space indicating whether
a variable, and hence an expression, is allocated in the storage or memory. To
consider this, we extend the definition of type as a tuple T = (Ψ | M)×T, where
Ψ refers to the storage and M to the memory.
T includes usual data type constructors of high level languages such as arrays
and dynamic arrays represented by T[n] and T[ ], respectively. Structures are
represented by 〈T · · ·T〉. Keys for mappings are constrained to types included in
type K. The type uintm defines 2m-bit unsigned integers for 3 ≤ m ≤ 8. We do
not provide specification for other primitive types other than uint because we can
construct them based on uint. The type ref is not an explicit type in Solidity,
but the compiler uses it implicitly when allocating in memory variables with
complex data types. Solidity includes specific types such as contracts allocated
in the ledger represented by the type contract.
State Specification We represent the storage as Ψ : P 7→ B, a function from
addresses in the domain of positive numbers to bytes. Since static variables are
allocated in the storage sequentially from address 0, we attach a next address Λ
to Ψ to indicate where a new declared variable is allocated into. In addition, Ψ
is also associated with a name space NΨ : IDΨ 7→ P ∪ None and a type space
τΨ : IDΨ 7→ T∪None, respectively mapping variables to memory addresses and
types. We denote with id /∈ NΨ or id /∈ τΨ to represent that id is mapped to
None in the name space or type space, respectively.
Memory, denoted by M , is also a function M : P 7→ B from addresses to
bytes. It is used to store local variables in functions. Similar to storage, M is
also associated with a name space NM : IDM 7→ P ∪ None and a type space
τM : IDM 7→ T ∪None. Differently from the spaces in the storage, the memory
contains a stack of name and type spaces q to model new scopes when calling a
function. For simplicity, NM and τM access the top spaces in q and we omit Ψ
and M when it is clear in the context.
We use σ = (Ψ,M,Ω) to denote the storage and memory configuration of a
smart contract instance, and Ω is a stack of storage configuration for handling
external function calls. We access the elements of σ with Ψσ, Mσ, and Ωσ. The
overall configuration of a smart contract instance is denoted by 〈σ,Prog〉, where
Prog is the set of program statements. After a smart contract instance is deployed
on the blockchain, it is identified by a unique 256-bit address. We denote the
configuration of the blockchain by ∆, which is a function mapping α, a 256-bit
address of a contract instance, to its configuration σ, i.e., ∆(α) = σ.
To access locations in Ψ and M , we use [addr]sizestore to represent a value
stored in position addr of size bytes stored in store . Thus, given a variable id
allocated in Ψ , the notation [NΨ (id)]
Size (τΨ (id))
Ψ represents the stored value of id.
Function Size gives the number of bytes a datatype, considering packing and
padding applied in Solidity during variable allocation. We provide a detailed
specification in Appendix D.
State Modifications in Rules For a configuration σ, we use σ′ to denote the
configuration after we apply changes on σ. For example, the following rule Ex
does two changes in σ: (1) it modifies the type space τ in the storage Ψ for the
element id to value Type, and (2) it modifies the name space N in the storage Ψ
for the element id to value v. Any other state component such as the storage Ψ ,
the memory M , or elements different from id in τΨ and NΨ are not changed.
τΨσ′ (id) = Type NΨσ′ (id) = v
〈σ,Exp〉 −→ 〈σ′, ·〉 Ex
3.2 Structural Operational Semantics of Solidity
We abstract the semantics of solidity in rules for statements, expressions, and
types. Most of the statements and semantics in Solidity are very similar to those
used in high level languages like Java and C. For space reasons, we focus on the
semantic for the evaluation of expressions involving storage/memory access, e.g.,
variable access, arrays, and mapping. We also focus on statements for variable
declaration and function calls. We define the rules inductively based on Solidity
type constructors and statements.
We first start with the semantics for instructions defining variables repre-
sented by rules VD1 and VD2. Notice that if a state variable is declared without
giving the initial value, it is initialized as zero.
ER(σ,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂, v〉
Nσ̂′ id = dΛσ̂e(l,Type)
Λσ̂′ = Λσ̂ ↑ (l,Type)
τσ̂′ id = Type
id 6∈ Nσ̂
[Nσ̂′ id]
Size Type
σ̂′ =v
〈σ,Type id = Exp ;〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, ·〉 VD1
ER(σ,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂, v〉
Mσ̂′ = frσ̂(id,Type,v)
id 6∈ Nσ̂
〈σ,Type id = Exp ;〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, ·〉 VD2
Let us take the example in Fig. 1 (a) to illustrate the rules for variable
declarations. Here, we have two state variables declaration statements for a and
b, respectively. To allocate a, the rule performs six steps. (1) the rule calculates
the value a is going to be initialized to using the R-Value of Exp from state σ.
Note that an expression can be a function, therefore the Exp may have side effects
and modify σ to σ̂. (2-3) the rule updates the name space and type space for
variable id. The type space is updated to Type, i.e., uint128 in this example. We
update the name space using the function dΛel,Type. dΛel,Type uses Solidity rules
for allocation of variables to calculate if the declared variable must be allocated
in the current free position Λ or in the next position aligned to l. If the declared
variable is a complex datatype then it must be allocated in a memory address
aligned to l. Otherwise, it calculates the next address aligned to Λ if the current
position plus the size of the datatype is bigger than the next address aligned to
l. In Solidity the memory alignment l is 32 bytes. In the example, Λ takes the
initial value of zero which is aligned to 32. Note that VD1 refers only to storage
variables, therefore we omit Ψ in the rule when accessing N and τ . (4), Λ is
updated using Λ ↑ (l, T ype) first aligning Λ to l if it is necessary, and then it
increases it with the size of the type of the variable, which in the example is 16,
the size of (uint128). The rules to calculate the size of a type considers padding
and packing of types (see D for more details). (5) the memory address where the
variable is allocated takes the value of the R-Value of the expression, which is 1.
And (6) the rule checks that the current id does not belongs to the name space
in Psi. After the allocation, variable a is allocated in the beginning of slot 0 and
occupies 16 bytes, as shown in the blue box of Fig. 3 (a).
For state variable b, its type is uint256, which is the basic type of 256-bit
unsigned integers. Since variable b requires 32 bytes, we are not able to allocate
b within the next address aligned to 32, that is within the slot 0. Instead, we
need to allocate it in the next storage slot. After the allocation, variable b is
allocated at address 32 (the beginning of slot 1) and occupies 32 bytes, as shown
in red box of Fig. 3 (a). The auxiliary variable Λ is updated to 64 accordingly.
Let see another smart contract example in Fig. 1 (b). After allocating the
state variable a, auxiliary variable Λ become 16, as shown in the blue part of
Fig. 3 (c). Notice that b is an array of two elements, each of which is an array
of three uint128 integers. That is, b[0] = [1,2,3] and b[1] = [4,5,6]. To
allocate the state variable b, rule Size used in function Λ ↑ (32, uint128[3][2])
packs together the first two unsigned integers of the first dimension of the array,
and adds padding for the second one to align the array to 32. Then the size of
the first dimension of b is 64 bytes and the total size of the type is 128 bytes.
So, totally, four storage slots are allocated to b, as shown in the red part of
Fig. 3 (c).
d[0]
d[1]
00000…000000x0 00000…00007
0000000000…000000000000080x1
00000…000010x0 00000…00000
0000000000…000000000000020x1
a
b
00000…000090x0 00000…00000
00000…000010x1 00000…00002
00000…000030x2 00000…00000
00000…000040x3 00000…00005
00000…000060x4 00000…00000
b[1]
b[0]
00000…000090x0 00000…00000
00000…000000x1 00000…00007
00000…000000x2 00000…00008
00000…000040x3 00000…00005
00000…000060x4 00000…00000
d[0]
d[1]
d[2]
(a) (b)
d[0]
d[1]
00000…000000x0 00000…00007
0000000000…000000000000080x1
00000…000010x0 00000…00000
0000000000…000000000000020x1
a
b
00000…000090x0 00000…00000
00000…000010x1 00000…00002
00000…000030x2 00000…00000
00000…000040x3 00000…00005
00000…000060x4 00000…00000
b[1]
b[0]
00000…000090x0 00000…00000
00000…000000x1 00000…0000a
00000…000000x2 00000…0000b
00000…000040x3 00000…00005
00000…000060x4 00000…00000
d[0]
d[1]
d[2]
a
(c) (d)
Fig. 3. State Variable Declaration
The rule VD2 is similar the rule for state variable declarations except that
the target is memory instead of storage and that we allocate the position and
the R-Value of the expression in a fresh location. Function fr updates id in
spaces N.M and τ.M with a new fresh address in memory and Type, respectively.
Additionally fr copies the expression R-Value to the new location. After all the
state variables are declared, whenever they need to be evaluated in statements,
the following two rules are applicable to get their L-values and R-values.
Rule E RV returns the value of address addr in the configuration σ̂ obtained
after the l-valuation of expression exp in the state σ. The accessed memory space,
i.e., M or Ψ , is calculated from the type of exp. This behaviour is abstracted in
the function ST.
E(σ, exp) −→ (σ̂, addr) [addr]Size(Typeσ̂ exp)(ST exp)σ̂ =v
ER(σ, exp) −→ 〈σ̂, v〉 ERV
id ∈ NΨσ id /∈ NMσ
E(σ, id) −→ 〈σ, (NΨσ id))〉 E-ID1
id ∈ NMσ
E(σ, id) −→ 〈σ, (NσM id))〉
E-ID2
Let us see function foo() in Fig. 1 (a). Here, we declare a local array d, whose
type is uint256[2] storage. Notice that, in Solidity, if an array is declared
in a function without specifying the area (either in storage or memory), its
default area is in storage. However, since we did not initialized the array d, it
references the storage slot 0 by default. Thus, changing the values of d[0] and
d[1] overwrites the content in storage slots 0 and 1, as shown in the red part of
Fig. 3 (b). That is why the values of a and b are changed to 0 and 8 after the
execution of function foo(). Similarly, the local array d in function foo2() in
Fig. 1 (b) references storage slot 0 by default as well. Thus, changing d[1] and
d[2] overwrites the content in storage slots 1 and 2, as shown in the red part
of Fig. 3 (d). That is why the global array b becomes [0,10,0] after function
foo2() is executed. The evaluation of arrays can be performed by the following
rules inductively.
1 contract Test3 {
2 uint256 [] a;
3
4 function foo3() public {
5 a.push (10);
6 a.push (11);
7 }
8 }
(a)
1 contract Test4 {
2 mapping(uint=>uint) a;
3
4 function foo4() public {
5 a[100] = 10;
6 a[200] = 11;
7 }
8 }
(b)
Fig. 4. Dynamic Arrays and Mapping
00000000000…00000000000000x0
...
0x290decd9548b62a8d60345a988386fc
84ba6bc95484008f6362f93160ef3e563
0x290decd9548b62a8d60345a988386fc
84ba6bc95484008f6362f93160ef3e564
00000000000…000000000000b
00000000000…000000000000a
00000000000…0000000000002
0x000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
...
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Dynamic Array
Typeσ Expb = T[n]
i ≤ n
ER(σ,Expi) −→ 〈σ̂, i〉
E(σ̂,Expb) −→ 〈σ̂′, addrb〉
v = addrb + (i ∗ Size T)
E(σ,Expb[Expi]) −→ 〈σ̂′, v〉 E-ARRAY
Typeσexp = Type[ ] ER(σ,Expb) −→ 〈σ̂, len〉
E(σ, exp.length) −→ 〈σ̂, len〉 E-ARRAY-LEN
In addition, Solidity provides two special data structures, dynamic array and
mapping, which allocation is based on hash functions. Fig. 4 (a) shows a simple
contract using a dynamic array a. When a dynamic array is declared, it has
no element, and one storage slot is allocated to it as the base slot to store the
number of elements it has so far, as shown in Fig. 5 (a). We can push elements
into a dynamic array, e.g., function foo3() in Fig. 4 (a) pushes two integers,
10 and 11, into the dynamic array a. Now, the unique characteristic of dynamic
arrays is that the location to store the pushed element is decided by a hash
function, denoted by HASH. The first element will be stored in storage slot t
where t = HASH(bytes32(p)) and bytes32(p) is the base slot number of the
0x9db7038e59677010ca8f72fa448bad1
b4f3c53346b666689163ccac31db46772
0xc5f2c791ab4e0b1a0b6c600884b07e9
8575b00ebd7c3166c4272a53bebf71403
00000000000…0000000000000
0x000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000 ...
00000000000…000000000000a
...
00000000000…000000000000b
0x0
...
00000000000…0000000000000
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Mapping
dynamic array padded into 32 bytes long. The second element will be stored in
slot t + 1, and so on. Fig. 5 (b) shows the locations to store the two elements
pushed into a. Notice that the value of the base slot is updated to 2 because a
now has two elements. The rule for evaluating dynamic arrays can be obtained
by the following rule. We use rule Typeσ exp to check that the current expression
is indeed a dynamic array. First, we obtain the l-value of the base expression to
calculate the address where the expression is allocated. Second, we access to its
value to check that the R-Value of the index expression is within the number of
elements allocated in the dynamic array. With this information we calculate the
final address through the Hashing function on the base address and the index
accessed.
Typeσ Expb = Type[]
[addrb]
Size(Typeσ̂ Expb)
(ST Expb)σ̂
=v
i ≤ (v − 1)
E(σ̂,Expb) −→ 〈σ̂′, addrb〉
ER(σ,Expi) −→ 〈σ̂, i〉
a = addr32(HASH(bytes32(addrb)) + i)
E(σ,Expb[Expi]) −→ 〈σ̂′, a〉 E-D-ARRAY
Fig 4 (b) shows another contract using a mapping m, which maps an unsigned
integer to another. After it is declared, one storage slot is allocated to it as
the base slot, but nothing is stored there, as shown in Fig. 6 (a). We can add
key/value pair into a mapping, e.g., function foo4() in Fig. 4 (b) adds two
key/value pairs (100 : 10) and (200 : 11), where 100 and 200 are keys and 10
and 11 are their corresponding values. The unique characteristic of mappings is
that the location to store values is decided by the hash function as well. For a
key/value pair (k : v) of a mapping with its base slot at p, the value v will be
stored in storage slot t = HASH(bytes32(p) · bytes32(k)) where bytes32(k) is
the key padded into 32 bytes long and · is the concatenation operator. Fig. 6 (b)
shows the locations to store the two values 10 and 11. The rule for evaluating
mappings can be performed by the following rule:
v = addr32(HASH(bytes32(addrb) · bytes32(i)))
Typeσ Expb = Mapping K T E(σ̂,Expb) −→ 〈σ̂′, addrb〉
Typeσ Expi = K ER(σ,Expi) −→ 〈σ̂, i〉
E(σ,Expb[Expi]) −→ 〈σ̂′, v〉 E-MAPPING
The semantics of an internal function call is captured by the rules I-FUN and
E-FUN to model when a function’s role is an instruction or an expression. Every
internal function call have its own name and type space to store local variables,
arguments, and return values. Thus, a fresh name N’ and type τ spaces are
pushed into the stack q, and the internal function call id(Exp1, . . . ,Expn) is
rewritten into a sequence of memory variable declaration statements to link
arguments with function parameters, followed by the returning value, if any,
and the function body Block. When behaving as an expression the function call
will return the L-Value of the returned variable, which value is added by the
execution of the return instruction. The evaluation of both the instruction and
the expression removes the name and type spaces from the stack the memory
contains.
〈Mσ′ .Push(N′, τ ′),T1 M p1 = Exp1; . . . ; Tn M pn = Expn; Block〉 → 〈σ̂, .〉
Γpid = Block Γtid = ((T1, . . . ,Tn), ) Mσ̂′ .Pop()
〈σ, id(Exp1, . . . ,Expn)〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, .〉 I-FUN
〈Mσ′ .Push(N′, τ ′),T1 M p1 = Exp1; . . . ; Tn M pn = Expn; Tr M pr; Block〉 → 〈σ̂, .〉
v = Nσ̂pr Γpid = Block Γtid = ((T1, . . . ,Tn), (Typer)) Mσ̂′ .Pop()
E(σ, id(Exp1, . . . ,Expn)) −→ 〈σ̂′, v〉 E-FUN
The rules for executing the statements in the function body are the similar to
those used in high level programming languages and can be found in Appendix C.
Here, we only highlight some important rules. For the (return Exp;) statement,
we obtain the R-Value of the returning expression, and we assign it to the return
variable declared when calling the function. Therefore the returning value is
available to the caller after returning from the call when the function is in an
expression.
ER(σ,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂, v〉 [Nσ̂pr]Size (τσ̂pr)(ST exp)σ̂ =v
〈σ, return Exp ; 〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, .〉 RETURN
The semantics of external function calls is captured by the following two
rules. The E-FUN1 rule is applicable when one contract instance wants to call
an external function id2 of another contract instance located in address α. Af-
ter looking up the configuration of the callee contract, σ¨, we push the caller’s
configuration σ into the callee’s configuration stack such that when the external
function call is finished, the caller’s configuration can be restored. Then, the ex-
ternal function call is translated into an internal function call under the callee’s
configuration. The E-FUN2 rule is applicable when one contract instance just
wants to send ether to another contract instance located in address α without
calling any function. In this case, the fallback function of the callee contract will
be invoked.
id1 : Contract in address α
id2 : function (Type1, . . . ,Typen)
∆(α) = σ¨
Ω¨′ = Ω¨.push(σ)
E(σ,Expeth) −→ 〈σ,m〉
E(σ,Expgas) −→ 〈σ, n〉
〈σ, id1.id2(Exp1, . . . ,Expn).value(Expeth).gas(Expgas)〉 −→ 〈σ¨′, id2(Exp1, . . . ,Expn)〉 E-FUN1
id : Contract in address α
E(σ,Expeth) −→ 〈σ,m〉
E(σ,Expgas) −→ 〈σ, n〉
∆(α) = σ¨
Ω¨′ = Ω¨.push(σ)
〈σ, id.call.value(Expeth).gas(Expgas)〉 −→ 〈σ¨′, fallBack()〉 E-FUN2
4 Solidity Semantics in K-framework
In this section, we introduce the Solidity semantics we have implemented in K-
framework[5] by illustrating some important rules. This implementation reflects
the idea of the formal specification we introduce in section 3 and involves over
200 rules. The K definition of the Solidity semantics takes up more than 2000
lines and consists of three main parts, namely syntax, configuration and rules.
The syntax can be found in [7], and the configuration of the semantics is attached
in the appendix A, so we do not explain these parts in detail when presenting
the rules. Due to limit of space, we only show some important rules here.
RULE Elementary-TypeName
< pcsContractPart(C:Id, X:ElementaryTypeName Y:Specifiers Z:Id = E;).K . . .>k
< < C >cname < N:Int⇒N +Int 1 >vnum < .MapN 7→ Z . . .>vId< .MapZ 7→ !Num:Int . . .>variables < .MapZ 7→ X . . .>typename< .Map!Num 7→ E . . .>cstore . . .>contract
Let us start with the state variable declaration for elementary type names
(shown in Rule Elementary-TypeName). When there is a state variable dec-
laration for elementary type names in contract parts, we take a record of it in
the contract cell. The number of variables will be increased by one (In vnum
cell). The symbol !Num means generating a fresh integer number as the address
of the variable. The two pairs: (1) Z to its address !Num and (2) the address !Num
to its value E are added to the variables and cstore cells, respectively.
RULE Function-Definition
< pcsContractPart(C:Id, function F:Id (Ps1:Parameters)FQ:FunQuantifiers returns (Ps2:Parameters){B}).K . . .>k
< C >cname < .MapF 7→ CF . . .>cfunction
< CF:Int⇒CF +Int 1 >cntfunction
.Bag⇒ < < CF >fId < Ps1 >inputparameters < Ps2 >outputparameters< FQ >FunQuantifiers < true >FunCon< 0 >return < B >body . . .>function
Rule Function-Definition is how we deal with function definitions. A
mapping from the function name to function Id is generated in the cell cfunc-
tion, which enables us to identify each function by using function Id. A bag of
the cell function containing function Id, input and output parameters, function
quantifiers, function body, etc, is created for this function definition. In this way,
we can retrieve the details of this function in the cell function.
RULE Internal-Function-Call
< functionCall(F:Id ; Es:Values)FunQs(FQ,F)y Call(F,Es) . . .>k
< ListItem(CI:Int) . . .>contractStack
< < CI >ctId < Cn:Id >ctname . . .>contractInstance
< < < Cn >cname <. . . F 7→CT:Int . . .>cfunction . . .>contract . . .>contracts
< < CT >fId < Ps >inputparameters < FQ >FunQuantifiers< Con >FunCon < B >body . . .>function
As for internal function call (shown in Rule Internal-Function-Call),
we need to process the function quantifiers first, and then Call which deals with
the execution of the function body. The function Id is obtained from the Id of
current contract instance and the name of the contract defining the function, to
retrieve the details of this function.
RULE Call
< Call(F:Id,Es:Values)BindParam(Ps,Es)y if(Con)B . . .>k
< ListItem(CI:Int) . . .>contractStack
< < CI >ctId < Cn:Id >ctname . . .>contractInstance
< < < Cn >cname <. . . F 7→CT:Int . . .>cfunction . . .>contract . . .>contracts
< < CT >fId < Ps >inputparameters < FQ >FunQuantifiers< Con >FunCon < B >body . . .>function
Rule Call deals with the execution of function body. It first binds the pa-
rameters of function call in current execution environment. After that, the body
of the function is executed with a condition specified by the function quantifiers.
If there is no modifier invocation in the function quantifiers, the condition is
always true.
RULE External-Function-Call
< functionCall(C:Int ; F:Id ; Es:Values ; M:Msg)createTransaction(L)y functionCall(F ; Es)yreturnContext(C) . . .>k
< (.List ⇒ ListItem(C)) L:List ListItem(-1) >contractStack
< M1⇒M >Msg < (.List ⇒ ListItem(M1)) . . .>MsgStack
< (.List => ListItem(F)) . . .>functionStack
Rule External function call is associated with transactions. The input
parameters of External function call are the Id of the contract instance to be
called, the name and parameters of the function and Msg which contains in-
formation about this transaction. The number of transactions that have been
executed is counted in createTransaction(L), followed by an internal function
call and context return. Meanwhile, the Id of contract instance, current Msg and
the function to be called are stored in the corresponding stacks, and the cell Msg
is updated.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate the proposed Solidity semantics from two perspectives: the first one
is its coverage, and the second is the ability to detect vulnerabilities in smart
contracts. Our test set is obtained from [7]. In Section 5.1, we show that the
proposed Solidity semantics covers most of the important semantics specified
by the official Solidity document [7] and is consistent with the official Solidity
compiler [6]. In Section 5.2, we show that some variants of DAO attacks can be
detected by using the proposed semantics, which facilitates the verification of
smart contracts.
5.1 Coverage and Testing
We evaluate and test the proposed Solidity semantics by using the official Solidity
compiler Remix [6]. The evaluation is done by manually comparing the results of
our implementation in K-framework with the results of the Remix compiler. We
consider the proposed semantics is correct if the result is consistent with that
of the Remix compiler. We list the coverage of our Solidity semantics in Table 1
from a variety of perspectives specified by the syntax provided by the official
Solidity document[7].
From Table 1, we can observe that the proposed Solidity semantics covers
most of the syntax except Hex number and literal, and Solidity assembly code.
As for storage, our semantics implementation in K-framework covers the fol-
lowing elementary types: address, bool, string, var, int256 and uint256.
User-defined type is partially covered, including struct and contract instances.
Mappings and arrays are covered, while function types are not. In addition, most
parts of semantics associated with functions are covered except state mutability
and specifiers which are ignored in our current semantics implementation in the
execution. Furthermore, a majority of statements and expressions are covered.
For all the parts of covered semantics, they are considered to be correct since the
execution behaviours involved are consistent with the official Solidity compiler.
Although our semantics implementation in K-framework is not complete yet,
it covers most of the semantics in smart contracts. Actually, the set of seman-
tics in which vulnerabilities of smart contracts lie has already been covered.
Taking the DAO attack (c.f. Section B) as an example, the two vulnerabilities,
reentrancy and call to the unknown, are mainly associated with the semantics
of function calls. For the uncovered parts, they can be either ignored or trans-
formed into the semantics that are covered such that the missing semantics does
not have a big impact on the execution behaviours. Thus, our implementation
of Solidity semantics can be used in the verification of smart contracts.
5.2 Detecting DAO Attacks
We briefly introduce the DAO attack in Appendix B. Interested readers can get
the detail there. We evaluate four variants of DAO attacks by using our im-
plementation of Solidity semantics in K-framework. We simulate the behaviour
Table 1. Coverage of The Proposed Solidity Semantics
Perspectives Coverage Perspectives Coverage
Syntax
Basic Syntax FC Using For N
Hex Number/Hex Literal N Event N
Assembly N Inheritance N
Storage Statements
Elementary TypeName If Statement FC
address FC While Statement FC
bool FC For Statement FC
string FC Block FC
var FC Inline Assembly N
int256 FC Statement
Other Int Size N Do While Statement FC
uint256 FC Place Holder Statement FC
Other Uint Size N Continue N
Byte N Break N
Fixed N Return FC
Ufixed N Throw N
User Defined TypeName P Simple Statement FC
Mapping FC
Array TypeName FC
Function TypeName N
Functions Expressions
Function Definition Bitwise Operations N
Constructor FC Other Expressions FC
Normal Functions FC
Fallback Functions FC
Modifier FC
StateMutability N
Specifier N
Function Call
Internal Function Call FC
External Function Call FC
FC: Fully Covered and Consistent with Solidity IDE
P: Partially Covered and Consistent with Solidity IDE for Covered Parts
N: Not Covered
of users on the blockchain by using a Main contract in which transactions are
generated. Notice that the mining process on the blockchain is not modeled. The
evaluation result shows that these DAO attacks can be fully executed, and the
non-reentrant behaviour can be detected from the values of cells in the config-
uration. The former indicates that our implementation of Solidity semantics is
executable, while the latter shows that some vulnerabilities in smart contracts
can be detected with the executable semantics, contributing to the verification
of security properties in smart contracts.
6 Related Works
K-framework (K) [17] is a rewrite logic based formal executable semantics defi-
nition framework. The semantics of various programming languages have been
defined using K, such as Java [10], C [13,12], and Javascript [14]. Particularly,
the executable semantics of the EVM(Ethereum Virtual Machine), the bytecode
language of smart contracts, has been created in K-framework[9]. K backends,
like the Isabelle theory generator, model checker, and deductive verifier, can be
utilized to prove properties on the semantics and construct verification tools.
For instance, K provides pre- and post-condition verification by using Matching
Logic [15]. Also, the Reachability Logic prover in K can be used to verify proper-
ties specified as reachability claims. In fact, K aims to provide a semantics-based
program verifier for all languages [11].
7 Conclusion And Future Work
In this paper, we introduce our executable operational semantics of Solidity in
K-framework. We present an abstract model of semantics and illustrate some
important rules implemented in K-framework. Experiment results show that
our Solidity semantics has already covered most of the semantics specified by
the official Solidity documentation[7], and the covered semantics are consistent
with the official Solidity compiler[6]. Furthermore, we show that our semantics
can be used to verify certain properties in smart contracts.
For future work, we plan to complete the Solidity semantics in K-framework
to completely cover all the features os Solidity. Additionally, we plan to approach
verification of attacks in Solidity contracts, identifying different kinds of vulner-
abilities in smart contracts [8] and constructing verification properties against
attacks.
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A Solidity Configuration
< < <
< $PGM:SourceUnit >k < Map >env
< ListItem(-1) >contractStack
< List >functionStack < List >newStack >thread∗ >threads
< Map >store < 1:Int >vposition
< < 0:Int >contractnum< < K >cname < (-1):Int >cId < Map >cfunction< 0:Int >vnum < Map >vId < Map >variables< Map >typename < Map >cstore < Map >dtype< Map >dstore < 1:Int >dim < Map >vdim . . .>contract∗ >contracts
< < < 0:Int >fId < Parameters >inputparameters< Parameters >outputparameters < K >body< K >FunQuantifiers < K >return < true >FunCon >function∗< 0:Int >cntfunction >functions
< < < (-1):Int >ctId < K >ctname< 0:Int >ctnum < Map >ctvId< Map >ctContext < Map >ctType< Map >ctstore < Map >memory . . .>contractInstance∗< 0:Int >cntContracts >contractInstances
< < 1:Int >cnttran < 0 |-> "Main" >trancomputation >transactions
< K >Msg < List >MsgStack
>T
B DAO Attack
DAO [4] is a contract which implements a platform for crowd-funding. As re-
ported before, $ 60M can be taken under the control of the attacker in the DAO
attack [18], which has a huge impact in the financial aspects. A simplified version
of DAO attacks is shown in Fig. 7. The smart contract Bank is used to collect
funding from different clients. A client can invoke the function deposit() to de-
posit ETH to its account in the Bank contract, or invoke the function withdraw()
to withdraw his/her credit. The malicious contract Attack can be used to stole
ETH from the contract Bank. Let us assume that the contract Bank has accu-
mulated a certain amount of ETH.
The attack can be launched in the following procedures. First, the contract
Attack is created and deployed with its state variable target pointing to the
victim bank in its constructor. After that, the function addToBalance() is in-
voked by the attacker to deposit 2 wei4 to the contract Bank. As a result, the
balance of Bank is increased by 2 wei. Since the contract Attack is just created
and deployed on the blockchain, its initial credit in Bank is 0. After deposit,
the credit of the sender in this case, should become 2 wei. Subsequently, the at-
tacker invokes the function withdrawBalance() of contract Attack to withdraw
4 Wei is the minimum unit of ETH. 1 wei = 10−18 ETH.
1 contract Bank {
2 mapping(address=>uint) credit;
3
4 function getUserBalance(address user)
5 constant returns(uint) {
6 return credit[user];
7 }
8
9 function deposit () payable{
10 credit[msg.sender] += msg.value;
11 }
12
13 function withdraw(uint amount ){
14 if(credit[msg.sender] >= amount ){
15 msg.sender.call.value(amount )();
16 credit[msg.sender] -= amount;
17 }
18 }
19 }
(a) The Bank Smart Contract
1 contract Attack {
2 Bank target;
3
4 function Attack(address addr){
5 target = Bank(addr);
6 }
7
8 function addToBalance (){
9 target.deposit.value (2)();
10 }
11
12 function withdrawBalance (){
13 target.withdraw (2);
14 }
15
16 function () payable{
17 target.withdraw (2);
18 }
19 }
(b) The Attack Smart Contract
Fig. 7. DAO Attack
2 wei from the Bank contract. In the function withdraw() of contract Bank, the
amount to be withdrawn is sent to contract Attack first (line 15), and then the
amount is deduced from the credit of contract Attack (line 16). When contract
Attack receives the withdrawn amount (due to line 15 of Bank), its fallback func-
tion (lines 16–18) is invoked. Inside the function body of its fallback function, it
maliciously invokes the withdraw() function of Bank again. At this point, the
amount to be withdrawn has not been deduced from Attack’s credit (line 16 of
Bank), which makes the condition checking in line 14 of Bank still valid. Thus,
contract Attack is able to withdraw money from contract Bank recursively until
the balance of Bank becomes zero.
The vulnerability comes from the fact that the withdraw() function of con-
tract Bank is not reentrant due to the wrong order of lines 15 and 16. The amount
to be withdrawn should be deduced from the credit first and then sent to the
withdrawer. If we switch the order of lines 15 and 16 of contract Bank, then the
function withdraw() becomes reentrant.
C Rules of Statements
ER(σ,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂, v〉
Nσ̂′ id = dΛσ̂e(l,Type)
Λσ̂′ = Λσ̂ ↑ (l,Type)
τσ̂′ id = Type
id 6∈ Nσ̂
[Nσ̂′ id]
Size Type
σ̂′ =v
〈σ,Type id = Exp ;〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, ·〉 VD1
ER(σ,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂, v〉
Mσ̂′ = frσ̂(id,Type,v)
id 6∈ Nσ̂
〈σ,Type id = Exp ;〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, ·〉 VD2
〈Mσ′ .Push(N′, τ ′),T1 M p1 = Exp1; . . . ; Tn M pn = Expn; Block〉 → 〈σ̂, .〉
Γpid = Block Γtid = ((T1, . . . ,Tn), ) Mσ̂′ .Pop()
〈σ, id(Exp1, . . . ,Expn)〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, .〉 I-FUN
ER(σ,Exp2) −→ 〈σ̂, v〉
E(σ̂, Exp1) −→ (σ̂′, addr)
[addr]
Size(Typeσ̂ Exp2)
(ST Exp2)σ̂′
=v
〈σ,Exp1 = Exp2 ; 〉 −→ 〈σ′, ·〉
ASSIGN
〈σ,Stmt1〉 −→ 〈σ′, ·〉 〈σ′, Stmt2〉 −→ 〈σ′′, ·〉
〈σ,Stmt1 Stmt2〉 −→ 〈σ′′, ·〉
SEQ
ER(σ,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂,>〉 〈σ̂,Block1〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, ·〉
〈σ, if (Exp) {Block1 } else {Block2 }〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, ·〉 COND1
ER(σ,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂,⊥〉 〈σ,Block2〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, ·〉
〈σ, if (Exp) {Block1 } else {Block2 }〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, ·〉 COND2
ER(σ,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂,⊥〉
〈σ, while (Exp) {Block }〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, ·〉 WHILE1
ER(σ,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂,>〉 〈σ̂,Block〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, ·〉
〈σ, while (Exp) {Block }〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, while (Exp) {Block }〉 WHILE2
Ω is empty
〈σ,Exp ;〉 −→ 〈σ′, ·〉 Skip1
Ω is not empty σ′′ = Ω.top() Ω.pop()
〈σ,Exp ;〉 −→ 〈σ′′,Exp ;〉 Skip2
D Rules of Evaluations
SizeR n〈〉 = n SR1
SizeR (dne(l,uintm) + (Size uintm)) 〈Tl〉 = m
SizeR n 〈uintm@Tl〉 = m SR2
SizeR (dnel + (Size T)) 〈Tl〉 = m
SizeR n 〈T@Tl〉 = m SR3
Size uintm = 2
m−3 Size1 Size T[n] = d(n ∗ (Size T))el Size2
SizeR 0 T@Tt = n
Size 〈T@Tt〉 = dnel Size3
Size T[] = l
Size4
Size map K T = l
Size5
Γtypefid = T
Size Call fid() = Size T
Size6
Size T ref = l
Size7
Typeσ exp = T[ ]
Typeσ expi = uintm
Typeσ exp[expi] = T
Type1
k ≤ i Type exp = 〈T0 · · ·Ti〉
Typeσ exp.k = Tk
Type2
Typeσ id = σtv
Type3
Typeσ exp = map K T
Typeσ expi = K
Typeσ mapacc exp expi = T
Type4
Γtypefid = T
Typeσ Call fid() = T
Type5
Typeσ exp = ref map K T
Typeσ expi = K
Typeσ mapacc exp expi = T
Type6
Typeσ exp = ref T[ ]
Typeσ expi = uintm
Typeσ exp[expi] = T
Type7
k ≤ i Type exp = ref 〈T0 · · ·Ti〉
Typeσ exp.k = Tk
Type8
daddre(l,PrimType) = if addr + Size PrimType ≤ l then addr else ((addr MOD l) + 1) ∗ l
| daddre(l,Type) = if addr MOD l = 0 then addr else ((addr MOD l) + 1) ∗ l
addr ↑ (l,Type) = daddre(l,Type) + Size Type
Accessing bytes memory : [addr]sm = v↔ ∀i.0 ≤ i < s→ m(addr + i) = v i
id ∈ NΨσ id /∈ NMσ
E(σ, id) −→ 〈σ, (NΨσ id))〉 E-ID1
id ∈ NMσ
E(σ, id) −→ 〈σ, (NσM id))〉
E-ID2
E(σ, exp) −→ (σ̂, addr) [addr]Size(Typeσ̂ exp)(ST exp)σ̂ =v
ER(σ, exp) −→ 〈σ̂, v〉 ERV
E(σ, exp) −→ 〈σ̂, addr〉 [addr]Size(Typeσ̂ exp)(ST exp)σ̂ =addrs
k ≤ i Typeσ exp = 〈T0 · · ·Ti〉
E(σ, exp.k) −→ 〈σ̂, addrs + dSizeR 0 〈T0 · · · (Tk − 1)〉e(l,Ti)〉
E-STRUCT
E(σ,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂, addr〉
k ≤ i Typeσ exp = ref 〈T0 · · ·Ti〉
E(σ, exp.k) −→ 〈σ̂, addr + dSizeR 0 〈T0 · · · (Tk − 1)〉e(l,Ti)〉
E-STRUCT-ref
Typeσ Expb = T[n]
i ≤ n
ER(σ,Expi) −→ 〈σ̂, i〉
E(σ̂,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂′, addrb〉
v = addrb + (i ∗ Size T)
E(σ,Expb[Expi]) −→ 〈σ̂′, v〉 E-ARRAY
Typeσ Expb = ref T[n]
i ≤ n
ER(σ,Expi) −→ 〈σ̂, i〉
ER(σ̂,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂′, addr〉
v = addra + (i ∗ Size T)
E(σ,Expb[Expi]) −→ 〈σ̂′, v〉 E-ARRAY-REF
Typeσexp = Type[ ] ER(σ, exp) −→ 〈σ̂, len〉
E(σ, exp.length) −→ 〈σ̂, len〉 E-ARRAY-LEN
Typeσexp = ref Type[ ] ER(σ, exp) −→ 〈σ̂, addr〉 [addr]Size(Typeσ̂ Type[])(ST exp)σ̂ = len
E(σ, exp.length) −→ 〈σ̂, len〉 E-ARRAY-LEN-ref
Typeσ Expb = Type[]
[addrb]
Size(Typeσ̂′ Expb)
(ST Expb)σ̂′
= v
i ≤ (v − 1)
E(σ̂,Expb) −→ 〈σ̂′, addrb〉
ER(σ,Expi) −→ 〈σ̂, i〉
a = addr32(HASH(bytes32(addrb)) + i)
E(σ,Expb[Expi]) −→ 〈σ̂′, a〉 E-D-ARRAY
Typeσ Expb = ref Type[]
[addrb]
Size(Typeσ̂′ Type[])
(ST Expb)σ̂′
= v
i ≤ (v − 1)
ER(σ̂,Expb) −→ 〈σ̂′, addrb〉
ER(σ,Expi) −→ 〈σ̂, i〉
a = addr32(HASH(bytes32(addrb)) + i)
E(σ,Expb[Expi]) −→ 〈σ̂′, a〉 E-D-ARRAY-ref
v = addr32(HASH(bytes32(addrb) · bytes32(i)))
Typeσ Expb = Mapping K T E(σ̂,Expb) −→ 〈σ̂′, addrb〉
Typeσ Expi = K ER(σ,Expi) −→ 〈σ̂, i〉
E(σ,Expb[Expi]) −→ 〈σ̂′, v〉 E-MAPPING
Typeσ Expb = ref Mapping K T ER(σ̂,Expb) −→ 〈σ̂′, addrb〉
Typeσ Expi = K ER(σ,Expi) −→ 〈σ̂, i〉
v = addr32(HASH(bytes32(addrb) · bytes32(i)))
E(σ,Expb[Expi]) −→ 〈σ̂′, v〉 E-MAPPING-REF
〈Mσ′ .Push(N′, τ ′),T1 M p1 = Exp1; . . . ; Tn M pn = Expn; Block〉 → 〈σ̂, .〉
Γpid = Block Γtid = ((T1, . . . ,Tn), ) Mσ̂′ .Pop()
〈σ, id(Exp1, . . . ,Expn)〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, .〉 I-FUN
〈Mσ′ .Push(N′, τ ′),T1 M p1 = Exp1; . . . ; Tn M pn = Expn; Tr M pr; Block〉 → 〈σ̂, .〉
v = Nσ̂pr Γpid = Block Γtid = ((T1, . . . ,Tn), (Typer)) Mσ̂′ .Pop()
E(σ, id(Exp1, . . . ,Expn)) −→ 〈σ̂′, v〉 E-FUN
ER(σ,Exp) −→ 〈σ̂, v〉 [Nσ̂pr]Size (τσ̂pr)(ST exp)σ̂′ =v
〈σ, return Exp ; 〉 −→ 〈σ̂′, .〉 RETURN
id1 : Contract in address α
id2 : function (Type1, . . . ,Typen)
∆(α) = σ¨
Ω¨′ = Ω¨.push(σ)
E(σ,Expeth) −→ 〈σ,m〉
E(σ,Expgas) −→ 〈σ, n〉
〈σ, id1.id2(Exp1, . . . ,Expn).value(Expeth).gas(Expgas)〉 −→ 〈σ¨′, id2(Exp1, . . . ,Expn)〉 E-FUN1
id : Contract in address α
E(σ,Expeth) −→ 〈σ,m〉
E(σ,Expgas) −→ 〈σ, n〉
∆(α) = σ¨
Ω¨′ = Ω¨.push(σ)
〈σ, id.call.value(Expeth).gas(Expgas)〉 −→ 〈σ¨′, fallBack()〉 E-FUN2
